Wednesday, August 08, 2018

‘The Dialectic of Aristotle's Ethics, circa 335 B.C.E.-- ‘Dialectogram’: ‘A Systematic-Dialectic Method of Presentation for the Domain of the Aristotelian Philosophy of Ethical Behavior’, Single Triad'.




‘The Dialectic of Aristotelian Behavioral Ethics, circa 335 B.C.E.--

‘Dialectogram’: ‘A Systematic-Dialectic Method of Presentation for the Domain of the Aristotelian Philosophy of Ethical Behavior’, Single Triad’.







Dear Reader,


The case of the [Philosophical sub-]Domain of Aristotelian Behavioral Ethics, a [sub-] Domain of Ancient Greek Philosophy, and of a theory propounded, circa 335 B.C.E., within that [sub-]Domain, one which, of course, still has relevance to us and to today, may also count as yet another case of possibly inadvertent dialectical ‘content-structure’ in the work of a philosopher -- in this case, in the work of one of Earth’s most prominent philosophers of all time.

This hypothesis of inadvertence must, however, confront ad hominem facts of this philosopher’s individual life which may cast doubt upon it.

To whit, Aristotle entered Plato’s Academy in his eighteenth year, and studied there for nearly twenty years.  He was immersed in Plato’s doctrine of the transcendental «Eide», and in a Platonian dialectic which was originally a theory of the statical/eternal interrelations of the «Eide», and/or a method for how the human mind might best navigate their realm.

Aristotle later rejected Plato’s doctrine of the «Eide». 

However, he still reserved a crucial role for his version of dialectic, as the art of locating the premises/postulates/axioms -- the «archai» -- of each special science; «archai» from which all else within each such science must be derived syllogistically-deductively.  Therefore such «archai» cannot themselves be arrived at by formal-logical deduction, as they, at least, lack premises of their own, from which they might be deduced.

Leaving aside any controversy regarding advertence versus inadvertence, our view of this doctrine as dialectical also comes, for us, together with some noticings of its unusual features as such.

First of all, it does not exhibit the ‘‘‘horizontal’’’ «aufheben» ‘meta-unit-ization’ relation that we so often encounter in dialectical ‘content-structure’, although, it does, of course, exhibit the ‘‘‘Platonian’’’, ‘‘‘vertical’’’ «aufheben» ‘meta-unit-ization’ relation of its three «species» categories, taken as units in their own right, ‘meta-unit-izing’ into their one «genos» category, also taken as a unit in its own right.

Secondly, the ‘uni-category’ here represents a ‘‘‘combination’’’, or ‘‘‘complex unity’’’, of the «arche»-category and/with the ‘contra-category’, by way of taking a position between, and ‘media[na]ting’ between, the former two.  Aristotle presents that ‘uni-category’ as a ‘‘‘qualitative mean’’’, of the qualitatively opposite extremes represented by those former two. 

The ancient Greek meaning of «to meson» is “the [qualitative] mean that is [qualitatively] equidistant from the [qualitative] extremes”, within the qualitative spectrum of the ethical/human-Behavioral dimension in question. 

This point brings us to our third noticing about this dialectic:  it is not the exact mean that Aristotle identifies as the human-Behavioral, ethical optimum. Rather, it is a biased “mean” -- biased toward that extreme which belongs in the ‘super-category’ of “excess”, as opposed to that of “deficiency”.  


FYI:  Much of the work of Karl Seldon, and of his collaborators, including work by “yours truly”, is available for your free-of-charge download via --



Regards,

Miguel Detonacciones,
Member, Foundation Encyclopedia Dialectica [F.E.D.],
Officer, F.E.D. Office of Public Liaison











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